Are You on the List? Dispelling the Myth of a Total Exemption from the Privacy Act’s Civil Remedies in Shearson v. DHS by Brumbach, Maxim
University of Cincinnati Law Review 
Volume 81 Issue 3 Article 6 
June 2013 
Are You on the List? Dispelling the Myth of a Total Exemption 
from the Privacy Act’s Civil Remedies in Shearson v. DHS 
Maxim Brumbach 
University of Cincinnati College of Law, brumbamg@mail.uc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr 
Recommended Citation 
Maxim Brumbach, Are You on the List? Dispelling the Myth of a Total Exemption from the Privacy Act’s 
Civil Remedies in Shearson v. DHS, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. (2013) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss3/6 
This Student Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of 
Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, 
please contact ronald.jones@uc.edu. 
1027 
ARE YOU ON THE LIST? DISPELLING THE MYTH OF A TOTAL 
EXEMPTION FROM THE PRIVACY ACT’S CIVIL REMEDIES IN 
SHEARSON V. DHS 
Maxim Brumbach*  
No one wants to be on the list. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the post-9/11 era, Americans have increasingly come to accept that 
collecting private information is necessary to national security.1  
Keeping the public safe undoubtedly requires the government to 
maintain lists of persons of interest and assess the threats such 
individuals pose to our national security.  But what happens when 
something goes wrong? 
Julia Shearson, a Harvard graduate and a prominent interfaith leader 
at the Council on American–Islamic Relations, found out exactly what 
can happen.2  On a Sunday evening in January 2006, Ms. Shearson was 
returning from a road trip with her four-year-old daughter.3  Their 
weekend getaway to Canada was drawing to a close as they crossed the 
Peace Bridge approaching Buffalo, New York.4  What happened next 
was a traveler’s nightmare.  When Ms. Shearson handed her passport 
over to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agent, the agent’s 
computer screen flashed red with the message “ARMED AND 
DANGEROUS.”5  Ms. Shearson was ordered out of her vehicle, 
handcuffed, and detained for questioning.6  Her car was searched, and 
she was not allowed to call her family or an attorney.7  After two and a 
half hours of questioning, Ms. Shearson was released without 
 
 * Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  This article was drafted 
in late 2011 and does not reflect the Supreme Court’s holding in F.A.A. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441 
(2012), which is outside the scope of this Casenote. 
 1. See David Crary, Post-9/11 Tradeoff: Security vs. Civil Lberties, HOUSTON CHRON. (Nov. 
22, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/article/Post-9-11-tradeoff-Security-vs-civil-liberties-
2277843.php#page-1. 
 2. Robert L. Smith, Julia Shearson Tells How a Weekend Trip to Canada Became 5-year Fight 
for Rights, CLEVELAND .COM (Jun. 4, 2011), 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/06/julia_shearson_tells_how_a_wee.html.  A native of Ohio who 
was raised Catholic and converted to Islam, Shearson helped open an office of the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations in Cleveland.  Id.
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  Shearson had no criminal record and had never owned a gun.  Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
1
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explanation.8 
After the incident, Ms. Shearson sought answers fromthe government 
but received only a few highly redacted documents in response.  She 
filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio under the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act seeking 
access to her records, a declaration that the CBP report was inaccurate, 
and an injunction requiring its correction.9  The district court ruled that 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had exempted its system 
of records from the civil remedies provision of the Privacy Act, and Ms. 
Shearson’s claims were dismissed.10  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit 
vacated the dismissal of Shearson’s claims for improper disclosure of 
information and for improper monitoring of activity protected by the 
First Amendment.11  In reaching this decision, the court held that an 
agency may exempt its systems of records from civil liability only to the 
extent that the systems of records may be otherwise exempted from 
substantive provisions of the Privacy Act.12 
Part II of this Casenote examines the validity of this interpretation 
related to the history and purpose of the Privacy Act.  Part III considers 
the competing interpretations in previous cases involving the law 
enforcement exemption.  Part IV analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Shearson v. DHS and argues that the statute’s language and underlying 
purpose support the court’s narrow interpretation.  Part V concludes that 
courts should follow the approach in Shearson, but Congress should 
pass legislation to protect privacy rights from encroachment by law 
enforcement agencies. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In the early 1970’s, America was faced with a problem: considering 
the government’s rapidly growing collection of personal data, how 
should citizens be protected from inaccuracies of records and misuse of 
personal data?13  This problem grew out of several technological 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Complaint, Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., (N.D. Ohio Jun. 15, 2006) (No. 106 
CV 1478), 2006 WL 2315107 [hereinafter Complaint].  The court also became frustrated with 
documents from the agency that were too greatly redacted to read or understand.  See Shearson v. U.S. 
Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06 CV 1478, 2008 WL 928487, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2008) (“The 
Court is greatly disturbed at the inordinate amount of redactions present in the government’s brief.  
Other than a general overview of the exemptions claimed, there is no other readable material.”). 
 10. Shearson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. 106 CV 1478, 2007 WL 764026, at *12–13 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2007) rev’d on reconsideration, No. 1:06 CV 1478, 2008 WL 928487 (N.D. Ohio 
Apr. 4, 2008). 
 11. Shearson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 499 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 12. Id. at 504. 
 13. See President Richard Nixon, Radio Address About the American Right of Privacy, February 
2
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advances, including the development of the computer14 and the rise of 
consumer credit cards.15  In addition to these developments, the 
Watergate scandal sparked fear about secret records the government 
kept.16  In this tumultuous political climate, President Nixon called for 
immediate action and created the Domestic Council Committee on the 
Right of Privacy to develop comprehensive recommendations for new 
legislation.17  Congress acted swiftly to draft a law that would protect 
individual privacy from government encroachment, ultimately leading to 
the passage of the Privacy Act.18 
The first subpart of this Part discusses the legislative development of 
the Privacy Act (the Act).  The next two subparts discuss specifically the 
development of the law enforcement exemption and the civil remedies 
provision.  The final subpart explains the structure of the Act, with an 
emphasis on the law enforcement and civil remedies provisions. 
A. The Legislative Development of the Privacy Act 
When Senator Sam Ervin, Jr. introduced an early version of the 
Privacy Act to the Senate, he said, “[T]he appetite of government and 
private organizations for information about individuals threatens to 
usurp the right to privacy which I have long felt to be among the most 
basic of our civil liberties as a free people.”19  Senator Ervin and other 
legislators conducted investigations, concluding that many government 
agencies maintained huge files of information without specific 
guidelines about their maintenance.20  Some of these databases were 
 
23, 1974, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Feb. 23, 1974), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4364 
(“Though well-intentioned, Government bureaucracies seem to thrive on collecting additional 
information.  That information is now stored in over 7,000 Government computers.  Collection of new 
information will always be necessary.  But there must also be reasonable limits on what is collected and 
how it is used.”). 
 14. See id. (“With the advent of the computer in the 1960’s, this data gathering process has 
become a big business in the United States—over $20 billion a year—and the names of over 150 million 
Americans are now in computer banks scattered across the country.”). 
 15. See Robin Stein, The Ascendancy of the Credit Card Industry, PBS: FRONTLINE (Nov. 23, 
2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/more/rise.html. 
 16. See 120 CONG. REC. S6741 (daily ed. May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in 
COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, U.S. SENATE AND COMM. ON GOV’ T OPERATIONS, U. S. H.R., LEGIS. 
HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, S. 3418 (PUBLIC LAW 93-579), SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY  at 4 
[hereinafter SOURCE BOOK] (“If we have learned anything in this last year of Watergate, it is that there 
must be limits upon what the Government can know about each of its citizens.”).  
 17. Nixon, supra note 13. 
 18. See 120 CONG. REC. S6741 (daily ed. May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in 
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 5–6; Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896-1905 
(1974). 
 19. 120 CONG. REC. S6741 (daily ed. May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in 
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
 20. See Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The First Amendment: A Living Thought in the Computer Age, 4 
3
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“blacklists,” encompassing unverified and outdated information.21  In 
many cases, different government agencies freely shared lists and 
records.22  According to Senator Ervin, people throughout the country 
were “concerned that through a computer error they may be denied basic 
fairness and due process of law with respect to benefits and privileges 
for which they have applied.”23  Senator Ervin illustrated this problem in 
a 1972 article, recounting the story of the mayor of San Francisco who 
was accused of involvement with organized crime based on 
investigative records that were improperly released to journalists.24 
Senator Ervin was not alone in his view; legislators had received 
reports that, in light of new data systems being built, failing to set limits 
on their operation would seriously jeopardize the security of citizens’ 
personal information.25  Such systems would be extremely costly to 
upgrade or replace after their initial implementation.26  Additionally, the 
government’s General Services Administration had proposed a massive 
centralized database of personal information called FEDNET.27  
Legislators were concerned that the law could not keep up with the fast 
pace at which technology was evolving. 
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, many politicians were also 
nervous about the power that the government could wield through its 
data collection.28  Congress was concerned about unauthorized 
 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 13, 15–18 (1972).  The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights had 
untaken a survey of government agencies about their use of databases.  Id. at 17.  In many cases, the 
Subcommittee had trouble getting responses from agencies or received “evasive and misleading” 
reports.  Id. at 18. 
 21. Id. at 19.  According to Sen. Ervin, these “blacklists” contained “masses of irrelevant, 
outdated or even incorrect investigative information based solely on personalities, behavior and beliefs.”  
Id.  
 22. Id. at 21–22. 
 23. Id at 23.  In his article, Sen. Ervin provides numerous examples, including several accounts 
of citizens being denied employment based on arrest records disclosed by the F.B.I.  Id. at 24–35. 
 24. Id. at 28. 
 25. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 7, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 160 (citing 
testimony of Dr. Alan F. Westin). 
 26. Id. (“[T]hese systems may become so large, so expensive, and so vital to so many Americans 
that public opinion will be put to a terrible choice—serious interruption of services or installation of 
citizen-rights measures.”). 
 27. Id. at 10–11, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 163–64.  Concerned about the 
project, the Vice-Presdent said that the government must “consider the fallout hazards of FEDNET to 
traditional freedoms.”  Id. 
 28. Id. at 11, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 164 (“The revelations before the 
Select Committee to Investigate Presidential Campaign Activities concerning policies and practices of 
promoting the illegal gathering, use or disclosure of information on Americans who disagreed with 
governmental policies were cited by almost all witnesses as additional reasons for immediate 
congressional action on . . . privacy legislation.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 8–9, reprinted in 
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 301–02. 
4
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wiretapping and the existence of secret White House enemy lists.29  
President Nixon commented that government knowledge about citizens 
“brings with it an awesome potential for harm as well as good—and an 
equally awesome responsibility on those who have that knowledge.”30 
As the Senate Committee on Government Operations reported, the 
Privacy Act was designed to “promote accountability, responsibility, 
legislative oversight and open government with respect to the use of 
computer technology.”31  Among its several purposes, the Act was 
meant to prevent “illegal, unwise, overbroad investigation and record 
surveillance of law-abiding citizens.”32  In drafting the initial bill, the 
Government Operations Committee relied on several sources, including 
a report from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare that 
recommended creating a Code of Fair Information Practice based on 
five core principles33: (1) there must be no personal data record-keeping 
systems whose very existence is secret; (2) there must be a way for 
individuals to find out what information about them is in a record and 
how it is used; (3) there must be a way for an individual to prevent 
information collected for one purpose to be used for another, 
incongruent purpose, unless there is consent; (4) there must be a way for 
an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information; 
and (5) any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating 
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the 
data for its intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of 
the data.34 
With these concerns in mind, both houses of Congress introduced 
bills to protect individual privacy.35  In general, the Senate bill placed 
stricter requirements on government agencies than the House bill did.36 
The Senate’s bill included a Privacy Protection Commission with broad 
oversight responsibilities, while the House version included a study 
commission with primarily an advisory role.37  In several ways, the 
Senate bill required agencies to maintain records only to the extent 
necessary to accomplish their purpose.38  Conversely, the House bill 
 
 29. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 8–9, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 301–02. 
 30. Nixon, supra note 13. 
 31. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 1, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 154. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 8–9, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 161–62. 
 34. Id. at 9, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 162. 
 35. S. 3418, 93rd Cong. § 203 (1974); H.R. 16373, 93rd Cong. (1974). 
 36. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622–23 (2004); Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 799 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
 37. 120 CONG. REC. 40405 (1974); reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 860–61 
(explaining House version of the bill). 
 38. See id. at 40406, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 861. 
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added limitations on the bill’s reach including the “routine use” 
exception that allowed agencies regularly to share certain personal 
information, such as payroll data.39  With a tense political climate and 
great pressure to take action, legislators worked a compromise between 
the two bills in the closing months of 1974.40 
B. Development of the Law Enforcement Exemption 
While the Privacy Act was arguably rushed through the legislature, 
one of the most debated issues was the extent to which national security 
and law enforcement agencies should be exempted from the terms of the 
law.41  Legislators recognized from the very beginning that national 
security and law enforcement efforts could be undermined if the public 
was granted access to sensitive agency records.42  Legislators in both 
houses of Congress sought to safeguard the work of agencies like the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Justice Department by 
creating exemptions, while balancing theses interests against the 
individual rights that the Privacy Act would secure.43 
The Senate created a narrow exemption in its version of the bill 
designed to limit public access to sensitive records.44  The Senate bill 
did not create a blanket exemption for law enforcement agencies, but 
instead allowed exemptions only for specific systems of records.45  
Under a revised version of the bill, law enforcement records were 
 
 39. REP. OF THE COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 120 CONG. REC. 40405–06 (Dec. 17, 1974), 
reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 859. 
 40. See 120 CONG. REC. 40410–11 (Dec. 17, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Hruska), reprinted in 
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 871–72. 
 41. 120 CONG. REC. 36960 (Nov. 21, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Abzug), reprinted in SOURCE 
BOOK, supra note 16, at 938–39. 
 42. Id. at 36960 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn), reprinted at SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 939–
40. 
 43. Compare S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 3, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 156, with 
H.R. 16373 § 2(i) reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 252–53. 
 44. S. 3418, 93rd Cong. § 202 (1974) (as introduced, May 1, 1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, 
supra note 16, at 23.  This section provided:  
The provisions of this title shall not apply to personal information systems— 
(1) to the extent that information in such systems is maintained by a Federal agency, and 
the head of that agency determines that the release of the information would seriously 
damage national defense;  
(2) which are part of active criminal investigatory files compiled by Federal, State, or 
local law enforcement organizations, except where such files have been maintained for a 
period longer than is necessary to commence criminal prosecution; or 
(3) maintained by the press and news media, except information relating to employees of 
such organizations. 
Id. 
 45. See id. 
6
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exempted only from provisions for individual access to records, inquiry 
into the source of records, and certain limits on the dissemination of 
records.46  In some cases, however, an agency head would have to show 
that access to a system of records would “seriously damage or impede 
the purpose for which the information is maintained.”47  The Senate bill 
also included a Privacy Protection Commission with a significant 
oversight and investigatory role in these determinations.48 
The House of Representatives designed a much broader general 
exemption that exempted certain records from nearly all requirements of 
the bill.49  The general exemptions applied to all systems of records the 
CIA maintained, and most systems maintained “by an agency or 
component thereof which perform as its principal function any activity 
pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws.”50  The exempted 
systems of records would be subject only to the requirement of 
publishing a name and description of the system.51 
A group of legislators led by Representative Bella Abzug, chair of the 
Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee, argued 
for a more limited law enforcement exemption.52  In Rep. Abzug’s view, 
exemptions from the bill were “justified only in the face of 
overwhelming societal interests.”53  She emphasized defining the 
exemptions “in specific terms related to the use of records rather than to 
the agency maintaining them.”54  Accordingly, Rep. Abzug proposed 
amendments to eliminate the general exemptions for the CIA and the 
Secret Service, arguing that “[a] blanket exemption for any 
agency . . . has no place in the bill.”55  Despite Rep. Abzug’s proposals, 
the exemptions were left in the bill that was sent to the Senate.56 
In light of the disparate versions of the law enforcement exemption, 
 
 46. S. 3418, 93rd Cong. § 203 (1974) (as passed by Senate, Nov. 21, 1974), reprinted in SOURCE 
BOOK, supra note 16, at 361–63. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. § 103, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 338–41.  The Commission was to 
investigate and report violations of the Act, review new data systems proposed by agencies, and make 
recommendations about implementing the Act and developing future legislation.  Id. 
 49. Privacy Act of 1974, H.R. 16373 § 2(i), 93rd Cong. (1974) (as introduced), reprinted in 
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 252–53. 
 50. Id.  The Act goes on to specify that the exemption applies only to those systems of records 
maintained for law enforcement purposes, including investigation, prosecution, confinement, etc.  Id. 
 51. Id. § 2(e)(1)–(3), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 247–48. 
 52. 120 CONG. REC. 36960 (remarks of Rep. Abzug), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, 
at 938. 
 53. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 17 (1974) (additional views of Rep. Abzug), reprinted in SOURCE 
BOOK, supra note 16, at 329. 
 54. Id., reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 330. 
 55. 120 CONG. REC. 36960 (remarks of Rep. Abzug), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, 
at 941. 
 56. See id. at 36960, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 943. 
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legislators soon reached a compromise in a further amended version of 
the bill that returned to the Senate floor.57  With these revisions in place, 
Senator Roman Hruska argued that the compromise did not effectively 
address the issue of national security and law enforcement records.58  
Senator Hruska, fearing that further change would drag out the process, 
proposed to deal with such records through separate legislation.59  U der 
pressure to act before the end of the legislative session, however, the 
Senate and the House both approved the compromise version virtually 
unaltered.60  The compromise version, substantively the same as the Act 
stands today, kept the House’s broad general exemption framework but 
added numerous sections to the list of non-exemptible provisions.61 
C. Development of the Civil Remedies Provision 
Embracing many of the same policy concerns as the law enforcement 
exemption, the civil remedies provision similarly required a major 
compromise between the two versions of the bill.62  The Senate version 
provided for strong civil enforcement, originally allowing plaintiffs to 
recover actual and punitive damages.63  The House bill, on the other 
hand, sought to limit the scope of government liability.64  While the 
Senate version required the plaintiff to prove only negligence, the House 
version required proof that a violation was “willful, capricious, and 
arbitrary.”65  Ultimately, legislators compromised on a standard of 
“willful or intentional” conduct, but added a statutory minimum of 
$1,000 in damages.66 
Significantly, the Supreme Court has construed the damages 
provision narrowly to limit recovery to actual damages proven by the 
plaintiff.67  Thus, while Congress arguably intended to create a type of 
 
 57. See id. 
 58. 120 CONG. REC. 36905–07 (remarks of Sen. Hruska), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 
16, at 809–11. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 120 CONG. REC. 40885–86, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 998–1001.  The 
principle difference involved the Senate’s Privacy Commission.  To reach a compromise with the 
House, the amended bill included a study commission with a much lesser role than originally 
contemplated by the Senate.  See id. 
 61. Compare Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896-1905 (1974), with 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a (2006). 
 62. See Haeji Hong, Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of 1974: Doe v. 
Chao, 38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 86–87 (2005). 
 63. Id. at 87. 
 64. Id. at 88. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Hong, supra note 62, at 89–90. 
 67. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 627 (2004). 
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presumed damages, the provision has not been interpreted to do so.68  
The policies that underlie the debate on government liability are too vast 
to discuss here, but it is sufficient to say the narrow construction of the 
Privacy Act’s civil remedies significantly limits the power of private 
enforcement.69 
D. The Structure of the Privacy Act 
In general, the Privacy Act lists numerous duties imposed on 
government agencies that limit the way they can collect, store, and 
transmit private information.70  The subsections place specific 
requirements upon the way an agency maintains its records.71  Most of 
these requirements, however, do not apply to law enforcement databases 
due to the law enforcement and routine use exemptions.72 
When the Act was drafted, Congress understood the need for certain 
government databases to be exempt from provisions of the Act because 
some databases involve sensitive law enforcement and national security 
information.73  Subsection (j) of the Act provides a general exemption 
for databases the CIA maintains, and provides exemptions for other 
agencies that principally perform activities “pertaining to the 
enforcement of criminal laws.”74  If an agency promulgates appropriate 
regulations including the reason for the exemption, then a system of 
records may be exempted from most of the Act’s provisions.75  
However, subsection (j) lists specific sections from which a law 
enforcement system of records may not be exempted.76  These non-
exemptible sections form a core of requirements that apply to all 
government databases.  Under these requirements, an agency must: 
 
 68. Id.; see also Hong, supra note 62, at 100–01. 
 69. Hong, supra note 62, at 102–03; see also Alex Kardon, Damages Under the Privacy Act: 
Sovereign Immunity and a Call for Legislative Reform, 34 HARV. J.L. &  PUB. POL’ Y 705, 758–59 
(2011). 
 70. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § 552a(j)–(k); see also infra note 74. 
 73. See S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 74–75, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 227–28; 
H.R. REP NO. 93-1416, at 3–4, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 296–97. 
 74. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2006).  This subsection provides, “The head of any agency may 
promulgate rules . . . to exempt any system of records within the agency from any part of this section 
except subsections (b), (c)(1) and (2), (e)(4)(A) through (F), (e)(6), (7), (9), (10), and (11), and (i) if the 
system of records is—(1) maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency; or (2) maintained by an 
agency or component thereof which performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to the 
enforcement of criminal laws, including [information concerning any stage of investigation, arrest, 
charging, disposition, sentencing or parole].”  Id.
 75. Id.; see also Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 957 (4th Cir. 1979). 
 76. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j). 
9
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(1) disclose a record only as specifically provided by subsection (b) of the 
statute−such disclosure is generally limited by the reason for the 
disclosure, i.e., law enforcement records may be disclosed for other law 
enforcement purposes;77 
(2) account for disclosure and keep the accounting on file for five years; 
(3) publish a description of each system of records in the federal register; 
(4) make reasonable efforts to assure that disseminated records are 
“accurate, complete, timely, and relevant” to the agency’s purpose; 
(5) maintain no record of First Amendment activity except as authorized, 
including when pertinent to and within the scope of law enforcement; 
(6) establish rules and security safeguards to protect confidentiality; and 
(7) publish any new use of data 30 days in advance of such use.78 
An agency also cannot exempt itself from the criminal penalties 
provision of the Act.79 
To enforce the duties described in the Act, the civil remedies 
provision covers four specific situations listed under subsection (g).  
These situations include when an agency (1) determines not to amend 
records, (2) refuses access to records, (3) fails to maintain accurate 
records, and (4) fails to adhere to other provisions of the Act and causes 
an adverse effect (the “catch-all” provision).80  The first two remedy 
provisions apply to parts of the Act that are within the scope of the law 
enforcement exemption.81  The remaining accuracy and catch-all 
remedies have been the subject of some debate among litigants since 
these remedies may be used to enforce rights guaranteed by the non-
exemptible parts of the Act.82  Because these subsections are not 
mentioned among the non-exemptible sections listed under the law 
enforcement exemption, courts have struggled to determine whether the 
exemption provision allows an agency to escape liability related to the 
accuracy and catch-all provisions.83 
 
 77. Id. § 552a(b).  The section permits, in pertinent part, disclosure (1) “to those officers and 
employees of the agency which maintains the record who have a need for the record in the performance 
of their duties”; (2) “for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7)”; (3) “to another agency or to an 
instrumentality of any governmental jurisdiction within or under the control of the United States for a 
civil or criminal law enforcement activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the 
agency or instrumentality has made a written request”; and (4) under certain other circumstances 
required by law.  Id. 
 78. See id. § 552a(j), (b), (c)(1)–(2), (e)(4)(A)–(F), (e)(6)–(7), (e)(9)–(10), and (e)(11). 
 79. Id.; id. § 552a(i).  This section provides for a fine of up to $5,000 for (1) willfully, 
improperly disclosing information; (2) willfully maintaining a system of records without notice; or (3) 
willfully requesting or obtaining a record under false pretenses.  Id. 
 80. Id. § 552a(g); see also Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 
2011) (quoting Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618–19 (2004)). 
 81. See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 502; Doe v. F.B.I., 936 F.2d 1346, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 82. E.g., Shearson, 638 F.3d at 502–03. 
 83. See id. 
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III.  CASE LAW ON THE LAW ENFORCEMENT EXEMPTION 
Two interpretations of the Privacy Act’s law enforcement exemption 
have emerged.  Under the first interpretation, some courts have held that 
an agency may exempt a system of records from civil remedies 
entirely.84  Under the second interpretation, other courts have concluded 
that an agency may exempt a system of records from civil remedies only 
to the extent that the Act’s other substantive provisions are exemptible.85 
A. The “Complete Exemption” Interpretation 
One of the first cases to test the Privacy Act’s law enforcement 
exemptions was Ryan v. Department of Justice.86  In Ryan, the Fourth 
Circuit reasoned that, but for a procedural failure, the Justice 
Department could have exempted its system of records from subsection 
(g) completely.87  The plaintiff, an FBI security officer, alleged that the 
Justice Department had wrongfully disclosed information to the 
Washington Post about his work.88  He sought access to a memorandum 
concerning him, as well as damages for the alleged wrongful 
disclosure.89  The court held that the FBI had appropriately exempted 
the system containing the memo from the Act’s mandatory access 
provision in subsection (d).90  The court explained that the Privacy Act 
requires an agency to promulgate rules stating both the exemption and 
the reason for such exemption.91  Examining the Justice Department’s 
regulations, the court concluded that the agency had provided a rationale 
pertaining only to subsection (d) of the Act.92  The agency had, 
therefore, exempted its records only from that specific subsection.93  
Nonetheless, the court stated that the agency “had the authority to 
exempt [the system of records] from the application of all the civil 
remedies.”94 
In 1986, a pair of appellate cases endorsed the same reasoning as 
Ryan.95  In Kimberlin v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Seventh Circuit 
 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 954 (4th Cir. 1979). 
 87. Id. at 958. 
 88. Id. at 955. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 957–58. 
 91. Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 957 (4th Cir. 1979). 
 92. Id. at 958. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1986); Alexander v. United 
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considered an inmate’s wrongful disclosure claim and ultimately found 
that the disclosure was proper under a separate routine use exception in 
subsection (b).96  In a footnote, however, the court echoed the Fourth’s 
Circuit’s view that systems of records can be exempted from subsection 
(g).97  As in Ryan, the statement was not necessary to the court’s 
dismissing the plaintiff’s claims.98 
Soon after the Kimberlin decision, the Ninth Circuit finally applied 
the complete exemption interpretation to bar a plaintiff’s Privacy Act 
claim.99  In Alexander v. United States, the plaintiff alleged that he had 
been terminated from his job as a security officer because the FBI failed 
to maintain accurate records on his rap sheet.100  According to the 
plaintiff, his record contained information about two arrests that a court 
had ordered expunged.101  Upon considering the plaintiff’s Privacy Act 
claims, the court held that the FBI had properly promulgated regulations 
to exempt its Identification Division Records System from the civil 
remedies provision.102  The exemption from the provision was 
necessary, according to the FBI’s regulations, because subsection (g) 
“concern[s] an individual’s access to records” and “the vast majority of 
records in this system concern local arrests which it would be 
inappropriate for the FBI to undertake to correct.”103  Further, the court 
stated that the law enforcement exemption “expressly prohibits suits 
against an agency for passing inaccurate information to a third party, if 
appropriate regulations have been issued.”104  The court provided no 
additional analysis of the statute’s language or purpose in reaching this 
conclusion.105 
Though the notion of a complete exemption from subsection (g) was 
explicitly held only in Alexander, other district court cases have 
confirmed the acceptance of this construction.106  In Aquino v. Stone, the 
plaintiff claimed that the Army wrongfully failed to amend a record 
stating that the plaintiff had been investigated for sexual abuse of a 
 
States, 787 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 96. Kimberlin, 788 F.2d at 435–38. 
 97. Id. at 436 n.2. 
 98. Compare Kimberlin, 788 F.2d at 436, with Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 958 (4th 
Cir. 1979). 
 99. Alexander, 787 F.2d at 1351–52. 
 100. Id. at 1350. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 1351. 
 103. Id. at 1351 n.2. 
 104. Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 105. See id. at 1351–52. 
 106. See, e.g., Aquino v. Stone, 768 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff’d, 957 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 
1992). 
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child.107  The court cited Ryan for the proposition that an agency may 
exempt law enforcement records from subsection (g) and never 
considered the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.108  Similarly, in 
Witherspoon v. F.B.I., the District Court for the District of Columbia 
succinctly held that the plaintiff did not state a cause of action for the 
F.B.I.’s alleged failure to maintain accurate records of his “rap sheet.”109  
As recently as March 2010, the District Court for the Northern District 
of Florida again confirmed the “total exemption” interpretation in Study 
v. United States.110  In Study, the court dismissed the pro se plaintiff’s 
wrongful dissemination claim against county officials and the F.B.I.111 
B. The “Limited Exemption” Interpretation 
Though the Ryan interpretation seemed to dominate the circuit courts, 
the D.C. Circuit reached a significantly narrower interpretation of the 
law enforcement exemption.112  In Tijerina v. Walters, the D.C. Circuit 
broke from the earlier line of cases, holding that the government could 
not use subsection (j) to exempt itself entirely from subsection (g).113  In 
Tijerina, the plaintiff alleged that the Veterans Administration (VA) 
failed to maintain records accurately and improperly disclosed the 
results of a home mortgage audit.114  The VA had conducted a random 
audit of Tijerina’s loan transaction and concluded Tijerina had lied on 
his verification of employment form.115  Though the agency declined to 
prosecute Tijerina, one of the agency’s inspectors learned that Tijerina 
had taken the District of Columbia bar exam and planned to take the 
Texas bar exam as well.116  The inspector sent unsolicited letters to the 
bar admissions authorities in both jurisdictions, informing them that 
Tijerina had falsified a document during his mortgage application 
 
 107. Id. at 529–30. 
 108. Id. at 530. 
 109. Witherspoon v. F.B.I., No. CIV.A. 96-619 GK, 1997 WL 135718, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 
1997).  This is a most perplexing result, since the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had previously 
rejected such a construction in Tijerina v. Walters,  821 F.2d 789, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also 
discussion infra Part III.B. 
 110. Study v. United States, No. 3:08-CV-493/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL 1257655, at *4 (N.D. Fla. 
Mar. 4, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08-CV-493/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL 1257654 
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010). 
 111. Id. at *1–4.  Admittedly, this claim was poorly made at best.  State and local officials are not 
subject to the Privacy Act. 
 112. Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 797. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 791–93. 
 115. Id. at 792. 
 116. Id.  
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process.117 
The court engaged in a lengthy analysis of subsections (g) and (j), 
ultimately rejecting the government’s complete exemption 
interpretation.118  The court initially observed that subsection (j) permits 
an agency to exempt a system of records from provisions of the Act—
not the agency itself.119  The exemption, the court reasoned, applies only 
to substantive requirements of the Act that would interfere with the 
secrecy of law enforcement activities.120  The court also cited a House 
Report that said law enforcement records would still be subject to the 
disclosure requirements.121  The court expressly declined to follow the 
reasoning of Ryan and Kimberlin, finding that the issue had not been 
squarely presented in those cases and such a construction would “make[] 
the Act a foolishness.”122  The D.C. Circuit later clarified Tijerina’s 
holding in Doe v. FBI, declaring, “[A]n agency cannot escape liability 
for non-exemptible Privacy Act obligations simply by exempting itself 
from the Act’s remedial provisions.”123 
C. The District Court’s Opinion in Shearson v. DHS 
In Shearson v. DHS, the District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio accepted the complete exemption interpretation and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s Privacy Act claims against DHS.124  In her complaint, 
Shearson alleged that DHS had improperly refused her access to records 
and had improperly disseminated her records.125  She claimed that DHS 
had “failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy of the 
records, improperly maintained records pertaining to her First 
Amendment activity, and failed to properly account for certain 
disclosures.”126 
Upon consideration of these claims, the district court concluded that, 
regardless of the merits of her allegations, Shearson had “no private 
 
 117. Tijerina v. Walters.  821 F.2d 789, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  This ultimately led to the Texas bar 
authority finding Mr. Tijerina “morally unfit to take the Texas bar examination.”  Id  at 791. 
 118. Id. at 795. 
 119. Id. at 795–96. 
 120. Id. at 796. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Tijerina v. Walters.  821 F.2d 789, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 123. Doe v. F.B.I., 936 F.2d 1346, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  The plaintiff in Doe v. F.B.I. attempted 
to strain the holding of Tijerina to render the agency liable under an exemptible part of the Act.  See id. 
 124. Shearson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 106 CV 1478, 2007 WL 764026 at *12–13 (N.D. 
Ohio Mar. 9, 2007), rev’d on reconsideration, 1:06 CV 1478, 2008 WL 928487 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 
2008). 
 125. Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 44, 50. 
 126. Shearson, 2007 WL 764026 at *12 n.14. 
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right of action” to pursue them under the Privacy Act.127  The court 
examined the reasoning of Tijerina closely, but ultimately rejected it for 
two reasons.128  First, the court found that the plain language of 
subsection (j) permits an agency to exempt a system of records from any 
provision other than those specifically listed.129  Second, the court 
compared the civil remedies provision with the criminal enforcement 
provision (subsection (i)) and determined that the inclusion of the latter 
on the non-exemptible list meant that Congress had deliberately 
excluded the civil remedies provision.130 
D. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, 
concluding the limited exemption interpretation reached by the D.C. 
Circuit was the better approach.131  The Sixth Circuit began its analysis 
with the plain language of the statute, but found that the language 
pointed in two different directions: subsection (j) omits subsection (g) 
from the list of non-exemptible provisions, but subsection (j) 
simultaneously precludes an agency from exempting a system of records 
from other provisions which would be vindicated through subsection 
(g)’s remedies.132  Against this backdrop, the court considered the case 
law for both interpretations.133  The court revisited the lower court’s 
comparison of the civil remedies provision and the criminal penalties 
provision, but ultimately found such a comparison unhelpful.134  The 
criminal penalties section makes certain conduct a crime while the civil 
remedies provision is “strictly an enforcement section” that relies on the 
rest of the Act’s substantive obligations.135  Thus, the court reasoned, the 
two sections are not parallel.136 
Moreover, the court observed that including subsection (g) on the list 
of non-exemptible subsections “might have caused confusion with 
respect to exemptible obligations.”137  If, as the court in Tijerina 
reasoned, subsection (g) provides remedies to both exemptible and non-
exemptible provisions then it would be confusing to include the whole 
 
 127. Id. at *12, *12 n.14. 
 128. Id. at *12. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 132. Id. at 502. 
 133. Id. at 502–03. 
 134. Id. at 503.  The court noted that this problem gave them pause, however.  See id.
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
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of subsection (g) on the list.138  The court also noted that subsection (j)’s 
non-exemptible provisions list omits a part of the Act that enables 
guardians to act on the behalf of minors, another provision devoid of 
substantive obligations which Congress probably did not intend to make 
exemptible.139 
Additionally, the court scrutinized DHS’s regulations and determined 
it was unclear whether they sufficiently exempted the system of records 
from subsection (g) in the first place.140  According to regulations, the 
system of records was “exempted from [subsection (g)] to the extent that 
the civil remedies may relate to provisions of [the Privacy Act] from 
which these rules exempt the systems of records, since there should be 
no civil remedies for failure to comply with provisions from which the 
Department is exempted.”141  With the scope of this exemption 
somewhat unclear, the court found the regulation to be ambiguous.142 
Since it had concluded that DHS’s system of records was not exempt 
from the civil remedies provision, the court vacated the dismissal of 
Shearson’s Privacy Act claims and remanded the case for proceedings in 
the district court.143 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the law enforcement exemption 
closes a loophole for government agencies that departs from the original 
intent of the Privacy Act.144  The court wisely considered the operation 
of other provisions to determine the proper function of the law 
enforcement exemption, rejecting earlier analyses that failed to do so.145 
The court’s decision supports private enforcement that the legislature 
intended as a key component of the Privacy Act.146  Though the vitality 
of the private enforcement scheme is in doubt, the court’s holding in 
Shearson preserves the core principle that government agencies must 
answer for failures to maintain records in the manner Congress 
 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. at 503–04. 
 140. Id. at 504.  The regulations further justified the exemption as “protect[ing] the Department 
from baseless civil court actions that might hamper its ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate 
investigative, intelligence, and law enforcement data.”  Id  Presumably, however, not all civil lawsuits 
will be baseless.  To the extent that they may hamper the collection and dissemination of intelligence 
information, meritorious private lawsuits are the means Congress chose to enforce the Privacy Act.  See
Hong, supra note 62, at 103–05. 
 141. Id. (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 1.36(d)(12)). 
 142. Id. at 504–05. 
 143. Id. at 506. 
 144. See supra notes 44, 53. 
 145. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503–04. 
 146. See Hong, supra note 62, at 103.  
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prescribed.147 
A. Textual Interpretation 
Upon meaningful consideration, a construction of subsection (g) that 
prevents complete exemption follows well-established principles of 
textual interpretation.  It is axiomatic that the starting point of any 
statutory interpretation must be the plain language.148  Acknowledging 
this principle, the Sixth Circuit observed that subsection (g) is 
“conspicuously absent” from the list of non-exemptible provisions of the 
Act.149  To other courts, this has ended the inquiry—subsection (g) is not 
on the list, so it must be exemptible.150  However, an appropriate 
analysis of subsection (g) must consider its role in the context of the 
whole statute.  Construing only one part of a complex statute could 
easily lead to illogical results, and such a construction should be 
avoided.151  The court observed that subsection (g) is “strictly an 
enforcement section” that must be interpreted according to its 
interaction with the substantive duties set forth in the statute.152  
Congress did not include subsection (g) on the list of non-exemptible 
sections because it does not belong there.  Rather, it is meant to enforce 
numerous substantive duties, some of them mandatory and others 
subject to the law enforcement exemption.153 
The Sixth Circuit declined to mention the simplest and strongest 
rejection of the government’s interpretation: the difference between an 
agency and a system of records.154  As the D.C. Circuit observed in 
Tijerina, subsection (j) permits an agency to exempt a system of records 
from most of the Act’s requirements, not the agency itself.155  
Subsection (g) provides a civil remedy when an agency fails to comply 
with certain parts of the Act.156  This remedy is used to enforce 
substantive obligations placed upon the agency elsewhere in the Act.  
Thus, an agency may exempt law enforcement records from subsection 
 
 147. See S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 16, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 169. 
 148. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 500.  
 149. Id. at 502. 
 150. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 151. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (“[I]n rare cases the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, and 
those intentions must be controlling.”). 
 152. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Compare Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 795–96 (D.C. Cir. 1987), with Shearson, 638 
F.3d at 503–04. 
 155. Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 795–96; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2006). 
 156. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (“Whenever any agency . . . fails to comply with any other provision of 
this section . . . .”); see Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 795–96. 
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(d)’s provision for individual access rather than attempting to exempt 
the agency itself from subsection (g)(1)(B)’s enforcement mechanism.157  
This difference reflects Congress’s intention that exemptions should be 
determined by the nature of the database—presumably, a law 
enforcement agency may maintain systems of records about 
employment, financial data, or other non-sensitive subjects that are 
properly regulated by the Privacy Act.158  Using the exemption 
procedures cannot provide a basis for an agency to escape all liability 
under the Privacy Act when the law enforcement exemption protects 
only certain systems of records.159  The court should have included this 
significant textual argument in support of its interpretation. 
On the other hand, the court provided two additional arguments based 
on analogies to other parts of the statute.160  First, the court rejected the 
government’s argument by analogy that Congress’s inclusion of the 
criminal penalties provision in subsection (j) indicates Congress meant 
to make subsection (g) exemptible.161  This argument invokes a 
traditional canon of statutory construction,162 suggesting that the 
inclusion of the criminal penalties provision is instructive to Congress’ 
intent to exclude others.  However, as the court wisely observed, 
Congress needed to include the criminal penalties provision because 
“there is no other place in [the Act] where conduct is made criminal and 
subject to penalty.”163  Since subsection (g) enforces the duties that other 
sections of the Act impose, it would be confusing to place subsection (g) 
among the non-exemptible provisions.164  Doing so would circularly 
create a non-exemptible cause of action against the violation of 
exemptible duties.165 
Second, the court made another analogy between the omission of 
subsection (g) and the omission of subsection (h).166  Subsection (h) 
 
 157. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d), (g)(1)(B); see also Doe v. F.B.I., 936 F.2d at 1351–52. 
 158. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 18–19 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 
311–12. 
 159. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (“The head of any agency may promulgate rules . . . to exempt any system 
of records within the agency . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 160. Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 503–04 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 161. Id. 
 162. The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius holds “that to express or include one thing 
implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.”  BLACK ’ S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see 
also Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503. 
 163. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id.  Consider subsection (g)(1)(B), which refers explicitly to an exemptible provision: 
“Whenever any agency refuses to comply with an individual request under subsection(d)(1) of this 
section . . . the individual may bring a civil action against the agency . . . .”  5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(B) 
(2006).   
 166. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503–04. 
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provides “that a guardian may act on behalf of a minor or incapacitated 
person” in pursuing a Privacy Act claim.167  It seems unlikely that 
Congress meant for agencies to exempt their databases from being 
accessed by legal guardians.168 
B. Lack of Analysis in Early Cases Interpreting Subsection (g) 
The Sixth Circuit appropriately rejected early cases dealing with the 
law enforcement exemption, since these cases reached a poor conclusion 
about the meaning of subsection (g) by extending Ryan’s initial 
interpretation without meaningful analysis.169  To begin with, the Fourth 
Circuit in Ryan mentioned the possibility of total exemption only in 
dicta.170  The court ultimately found that the government had not 
followed the procedure to exempt its system of records, making its 
interpretation of the breadth of such an exemption irrelevant to the 
holding.171  In Alexander, the Ninth Circuit went further afield by 
holding that the exemption “expressly prohibits suits against an agency” 
based on third party disclosure.  This was certainly a stretch, considering 
the Act makes no mention of “prohibiting suits,” and the “conditions of 
disclosure” section of the Act is non-exemptible under subsection (j).172  
Indeed, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress reached a 
compromise that avoided this type of “blanket exemption.”173  Courts, 
nonetheless, seem to have accepted this analysis over the years. 
To what may continued reliance on these cases be attributed?  
Perhaps this trend has emerged because plaintiffs have failed to present, 
effectively, the argument that Tijerina and Shearson support.  Several of 
the law enforcement exemption cases involve inmates who filed 
complaints pro se and seemed to find little sympathy with the courts.174  
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1351–52 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 170. Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he Justice Department could 
have exempted [its system of records] from the application of the 552a(g) civil remedies 
provisions . . . .”); see also Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing Ryan, 
595 F.2d 954). 
 171. Ryan, 595 F.2d at 958. 
 172. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2006); see also statutory text supra note 74. 
 173. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 74, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 227; H.R. REP. NO. 
93-1416, at 18–19, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 311–12. 
 174. See, e.g., Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 435–36 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(involving a plaintiff who sued for Privacy Act claims, Bivens claims for due process, and a conspiracy 
claim); Study v. United States, No. 3:08-CV-493/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL 1257655, at *2–3 (N.D. Fla. 
Mar. 4, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08-CV-493/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL 1257654 
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010) (involving a case in which the plaintiff named more than seventeen 
defendants and brought several claims including wrongful dissemination, reputational harm, and “pain 
and humiliation”). 
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Courts in some cases struggled to articulate the causes of action that 
these plaintiffs presented, sorting meritorious claims out of a heap of 
allegations against the government.175  It is easy to imagine that such a 
claim would not guide the court through the nuances of statutory 
construction. 
Conversely, the plaintiff in Tijerina, though also a pro se litigant, was 
a law student who made very specific and credible allegations of 
improper disclosure.176  This type of improper disclosure is one of the 
quintessential harms that the Privacy Act was aimed at preventing.177  
Indeed, many of the non-exemptible provisions specifically relate to the 
restrictions on disclosure.178  Whatever the reason for this inadequacy, 
courts have spoken of the law enforcement exemption in absolute terms 
only when they also declined to consider the results of such a 
construction.179 
C. Agencies’ Recognition of Limits on the Exemption 
Agencies themselves support the limited exemption interpretation, as 
evident from regulations promulgated by DHS and others.180  While the 
Shearson court acknowledged that DHS’s regulations were 
“ambiguous,” the court could have simply interpreted the regulations to 
mean that the system was only partially exempt.181  The regulations 
stated that the TECS database “should be exempt from [subsection (g)] 
to the extent that the civil remedies may relate to provisions of [the 
statute] from which these rules exempt the system of records.”182  
Though the court found the rule to be unclear, a better reading seems to 
be that these regulations explicitly limit the exemption to the otherwise 
exemptible parts of the statute.  Indeed, why would such language be 
included if it were the agencies intention to exempt a system of records 
from all civil liability? 
Unfortunately, courts have similarly failed to hold an agency 
accountable for its own recognition of limits to the exemption in other 
cases.  In Ryan, the court acknowledged that the FBI had justified its 
 
 175. See cases cited supra note 174. 
 176. Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 791–93 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 177. See S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 1, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 154. 
 178. See Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 796. 
 179. E.g., Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 438 n.2 (7th Cir. 1986); Ryan v. 
Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 957–58 (4th Cir. 1979). 
 180. See, e.g., Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 796.  Examining the Veterans Administration’s regulations, 
the court concluded, “None of the purposes the VA cited is remotely served by allowing the agency to 
escape civil liability for violations of the disclosure or accuracy requirements of the Act.”  Id. 
 181. See Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 504–05 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 182. See id. at 504 (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 1.36(d)(12)). 
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law enforcement exemption with respect to only one provision of the 
Act (the access provision).183  Rather than drawing an inference that the 
agency recognized limits to its own exemption authority, the court 
instead stated that the FBI could “completely exempt” its system of 
records.184  Similarly in Alexander, the Ninth Circuit offered no analysis 
of the regulations exempting another FBI database.185  Those regulations 
exempted the database because subsection (g) “concern[ed] an 
individual’s right to access records which concern him [and correct 
inaccuracies].”186  While this rationale plainly does not cover all parts of 
subsection (g), the court nonetheless considered this sufficient to bar all 
civil claims under the Act.187  Interpreting the agency regulations so 
broadly swept away many of the duties deliberately that Congress 
imposed on agencies188 
Admittedly, the Sixth Circuit did not have to rely on an interpretation 
of DHS’s regulation to reach its holding.189  Still, courts need not give 
agencies the benefit of the doubt concerning their own regulations.  
Since two viable interpretations of the law enforcement exemption exist, 
agencies should be on notice that their regulations will be scrutinized.  
This is particularly true, since there is essentially no incentive for 
agencies to police themselves.190 
D. The Need for Private Enforcement 
The Shearson court, like numerous others, largely avoided a 
discussion of the policies underlying the Privacy Act by reaching a 
conclusive holding based on the language of the Act.191  While this 
shows a measure of judicial restraint, it does not address the weighty 
policies underlying Congress’s enactment of the Privacy Act or the 
scheme of enforcement Congress designed. 
While the legislative history of the Act is somewhat limited, debate 
and compromise over the extent of the law enforcement exemption 
 
 183. Ryan, 595 F.2d at 958. 
 184. Ryan, 595 F.2d at 957–58.  The regulations read: “This subsection is inapplicable to th
extent that the system is exempt from other specific sub-sections of the Privacy Act.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 185. Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1351–52 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 186. Id. at 1351 n.2. 
 187. Id. at 1351–52. 
 188. See discussion supra Part II(A). 
 189. Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that the 
terms of Act itself permitted no such exemption).  
 190. See Hong, supra note 62, at 105. 
 191. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503–04. 
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shows the balance that Congress sought to strike.192  The Senate wanted 
to pass a bill that placed strict limits on agencies and gave strong 
enforcement powers to citizens and to an independent commission.193  
On the other hand, the House bill nearly cut law enforcement and 
national security agencies out of the bill entirely.194  Exemptions in the 
House bill would have placed vast areas of government data collection 
out of the reach of individuals.195  In light of differences between the 
bills, it is reasonable to conclude that subsection (j) contains a list of 
substantive duties that both Houses of Congress agreed to impose upon 
law enforcement agencies.196 
Moreover, the legislative history shows that Congress intended many 
of the included provisions to be vindicated through private 
enforcement.197  The Act provides a right to access and amend records 
that Congress designed with a private enforcement scheme in mind.198  
It follows that violations of the duty to maintain accurate and complete 
records would be enforced similarly.  Individuals have the strongest 
interest to protect their own rights, and compromise on the extent of the 
privacy rights secured by the Act shows that Congress never agreed to 
place agencies beyond the reach of private enforcement.199 
When considering the effectiveness of private enforcement, it is 
significant that the Supreme Court has placed strict limits on recovery 
under the Privacy Act.200  In Doe v. Chao, the court narrowed 
entitlement to the statutory minimum of $1,000 by requiring the plaintiff 
to prove actual damages.201  The Act itself imposes an initial limit on 
damages, which a plaintiff may recover only as the result of a 
government official’s “intentional or willful” conduct.202  The court 
found that the legislative history did not support “presumed damages” 
 
 192. Compare S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 3, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 156, with 
H.R. 16373 § 2(i) reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 252–53. 
 193. See S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 3, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 156. 
 194. H.R. 16373 § 2(i), 93rd Cong. (1974) (as introduced), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra 
note 16, at 252–53. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 197. H.R. REP. 93-1416, at 4, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 297; S. REP. NO. 93-
1183, at 82–83, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 235–36.  The Senate report noted that 
enforcement by private citizens was “doubly important,” since the revised bill no longer included 
enforcement through a Privacy Commission.  Id. 
 198. See H.R. REP. 93-1416, at 4, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 297; S. REP. NO. 
93-1183, at 82–83, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 235–36. 
 199. See Hong, supra note 62, at 103–06. 
 200. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 627 (2004); Kardon, supra note 69, at 758–59. 
 201. Chao, 540 U.S at 627. 
 202. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2006); see Chao, 540 U.S at 620. 
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for any such intentional or willful violations of the Act.203  By requiring 
plaintiffs to prove actual damages, the court further raised what was 
already a high barrier to private enforcement of the Act.204 
The high court may be poised to raise the barrier yet again, as it 
considers the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in FAA v. Cooper.205  In 
Cooper, the Ninth circuit construed the recovery of damages under the 
Act to include pecuniary and non-pecuniary harms.206  Other courts have 
reached the opposite conclusion, finding that damages may be awarded 
only for pecuniary harms.207  As the Supreme Court has taken up the 
question, it may further limit recovery in a way that utterly disables the 
effectiveness of private enforcement.208 
E. Other Means of Vindicating Privacy Rights 
With the effectiveness of the Privacy Act’s civil remedies in serious 
doubt, it is useful to consider other ways a plaintiff might seek to 
vindicate privacy rights.  In Shearson, the plaintiff sought, essentially, 
declaratory and injunctive relief only.209  Her objective was to learn the 
contents of the government databases that led to a “false report” and 
compel the government to amend them for accuracy and adherence to 
the terms of the Privacy Act.210  However, there are numerous other 
situations where the plaintiff seeks monetary redress as well.211 
One possibility might lie in state tort law, pursuant to which a 
plaintiff could seek redress for harms caused by improper record 
keeping.212  However, holding the government liable on pure tort 
theories, such as defamation, is difficult to accomplish.213  Often in such 
cases, “the primary damage . . . is mental distress,”214 which may be 
difficult to prove.  Another possibility might be a Constitutional claim—
the drafters of the Privacy Act based their grant of statutory rights on 
those found in the Constitution.215  As Senator Ervin noted, the Supreme 
 
 203. Chao, 540 U.S at 622–23. 
 204. See Kardon, supra note 69, at 759; see also Hong, supra note 62, at 102–03.   
 205. F.A.A. v. Cooper, 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3025 (2011); see 
also Kardon, supra note 69, at 766. 
 206. Cooper, 622 F.3d at 1035. 
 207. E.g., Cooper v. F.A.A., No. C 07-1383 VRW, 2008 WL 8648952, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
22, 2008), rev’d, 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 208. F.A.A. v. Cooper, 131 S. Ct. 3025 (2011); see Kardon, supra note 69, at 766–67. 
 209. Complaint, supra note 9. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See, e.g., Doe v. F.B.I., 936 F.2d 1346, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 212. See Kardon, supra note 69, at 741–43. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Id. (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 n.9 (1966)). 
 215. See 120 CONG. REC. 12646 (May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in SOURCE 
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Court has recognized fundamental rights to privacy in numerous 
circumstances.216  In Shearson, the plaintiff specifically alleged 
interference with her right to travel,217 a right that finds support in 
numerous Supreme Court decisions.218 
Ultimately, as Congress recognized in 1974, a specific legislative 
remedy is far superior to these mechanisms.219  Congress has the ability 
to consider diverse national interests in determining what privacy 
restrictions to place upon federal agencies.220  Leaving the remedies up 
to state tort regimes could lead to great inconsistency.  Because the right 
to privacy is implied only through certain parts of the Constitution, 
relying on the Constitution to protect individual privacy of its own force 
is also problematic.221 
F. The Balance Between Government Power and Individual Rights 
The history of the Privacy Act shows that legislators intended to limit 
the power of government in specific ways in order to secure important 
individual rights.222  By limiting the ways that the government can 
collect, maintain, and use personal information, the Privacy Act creates 
a tension between an individual’s right to privacy and the government’s 
interests in national security and law enforcement.223  Congress did not 
impose these limits lightly; the Act’s drafters considered privacy rights 
to be fundamental and rooted in the Constitution.224  The Supreme Court 
has also endorsed the concept of privacy rights arising out of 
Constitutional principles, whether through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection of liberty,225 through the First Amendment’s broad protection 
of speech and assembly,226 or through the history and tradition of our 
country.227  Given the importance of such rights, courts have every 
reason to examine closely any government agency’s attempt to escape 
 
BOOK, supra note 16, at 3–5; H.R. Rep. 93-1416, at 9, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 
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 220. See id. 
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liability for its misuse of private information. 
The increased consolidation of government information gathering 
indicates that the Privacy Act, in its current form, will not suffice to 
protect individual rights as Congress originally intended.228  As a part of 
ensuring national security after the attacks on 9/11, Congress created 
DHS and provided for a series of “fusion centers” that consolidate 
intelligence and law enforcement data.229  These fusion centers allow for 
cooperation among national intelligence agencies and local law 
enforcement.230  As a side effect, however, these agencies have applied 
anti-terrorism techniques to domestic law enforcement and created 
massive databases of shared information, which may often include 
incorrect or investigative information.231  Maintaining these centralized 
databases without mechanisms to ensure the accuracy of records will 
lead to the deprivations of due process that Congress sought to avoid 
when it enacted the Privacy Act.232  These may be the “blacklists” that 
Congress once feared, which can label a citizen a threat without bringing 
criminal charges or providing him an opportunity to prove innocence.233 
V. CONCLUSION 
In today’s era of staggering technological development, Congress and 
the courts must each play a role in protecting citizens from the harms 
our nation feared during the passage of the Privacy Act.  Courts should 
safeguard the Privacy Act’s enforcement scheme by refusing to 
recognize a total exemption for law enforcement agencies.  Providing 
for private enforcement of the Act’s substantive obligations is an 
important part of the statutory scheme Congress designed.  Individuals 
have the strongest incentive to ensure the accuracy and confidentiality of 
their own records, so allowing private judicial enforcement is an 
effective way to ensure government compliance.234  Since limits on 
damages have already reduced the effectiveness of private enforcement, 
maintaining at least basic liability for injunctive relief is essential to the 
continued utility of the Privacy Act. 
Ultimately, however, the legislature must act to provide broader 
protection of privacy rights.  Under the current systems, there are too 
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many obstacles preventing a plaintiff from obtaining relief—not only in 
damages, but also in injunctive relief to correct noncompliance.  After 
Julia Shearson was detained at the U.S. border without any explanation, 
she only wanted to understand what happened and to correct the 
government’s records about her.  As it stands today, the Act seems to 
appeal only to those who, like Ms. Shearson, are willing to fight a 
lengthy legal battle simply to access or amend a government record.  In 
some ways, the creation of the centralized DHS has realized the fears 
that Congress had in 1974, and cases like Sh arson confirm the risk that 
inaccurate records may deprive someone of basic guarantees of due 
process. 
There are a number of possible solutions.  Congress could expand the 
damages available and narrow the scope of the law enforcement 
exemption.235  This would allow plaintiffs to enforce certain rights 
effectively, though it would still leave many records inaccessible.  
Alternatively, plaintiffs might seek other routes to vindicate privacy 
rights under state law or perhaps under Constitutional theories, though 
there are a number of problems with these approaches.236 
The best strategy may be for Congress to create a stronger, 
centralized administrative system, like the Privacy Protection 
Commission that the original Senate proposal contemplated.237  The 
report from the Committee on Government Operations called for “an 
independent body of experts charged with protecting individual privacy 
as a value in government and society.”238  This administrative system 
would have several advantages, including: (1) complaints could be 
handled rapidly, (2) the amount of legal fees from litigation could be 
greatly reduced, (3) plaintiffs would have greater access to equitable 
relief, (4) the availability of damages could be kept to a minimum, (5) 
access to sensitive records would be limited to commissioners.  An 
organization like the Privacy Commission would give Congress greater 
oversight of government agencies and reveal areas of concern.  It would 
allow Congress to restore the original vision of the Privacy Act and 
renew its vitality in protecting citizens from the perils of unchecked 
government data collection. 
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